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FOREWORD 
Although model construction is an essential part of systems analysis, some of 
the most intractable intellectual problems in the subject are concerned with 
model use, rather than model design. This fact has always been a source of 
concern at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 
which devotes considerable attention to understanding the craft of systems 
analysis. 
This Research Report is a contribution to the debate on these questions. 
In particular, it concerns the questions of how to use the scenario approach in 
futures studies so as to give reliable guidance to policy makers. It is the result 
of collaboration among scientists from the Food and Agriculture Program and 
the Management and Technology Area at IIASA, together with a scholar from 
the Free University of Berlin. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews the major issues posed by scenario-based simulation modeling in the policy 
process, using agricultural policy as an example of a complex decision arena. Policy is seen as a 
process by which decision makers use the instruments under their control to approach the general 
goals of society. Models can help to choose instrument settings, evaluate policy options, and assess 
their appropriateness to a particular situation . But they cannot design policy; the interactions between 
policy makers and models are critical if modeling is to be useful in the policy process. Policy models 
must be oriented to the factors that focus and constrain judgments in the real world, as well as 
toward the substantive problems motivating analyses. These include the actors within the system, as 
well as the geographic and disciplinary contexts of the problems. Scenario-writing provides a way of 
ordering understanding and judgment about different phenomena to help users interact most 
effectively with a model and to insure that the perspectives of the model are most appropriate to the 
needs of the decisionmaker. It is an iterative and evolutionary process which can provide a great deal 
of insight into the assessment phase of policy design. 
Modeling in Policy Analysis and Design 
Quantitative policy analysis with the use of simulation models is a young art whose 
outlines are only beginning to show some contours. In several countries m·odeling 
for policy assessment and design is being used increasingly, while early and pre-
mature applications in others have led to setbacks, as high expectations which had 
been around were not met. This is especially true for applications to complex policy 
questions involving complex power structures and multiple interest groups with 
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diverse and often conflicting objectives. The role of modeling in policy analysis and 
design has been obscured by disagreements regarding the scientific rigor of models 
intended for policy application, their relevance to the policy arena, and their acces-
sibility to decision makers in business or public office. 
Modeling for the purpose of supporting policy assessment and design will always 
remain an art to a certain degree (Quade, 1975). But in order to attain its full 
potential in this area, it must develop a sound epistemological base oriented toward 
the policy process as well as a clearly defined view of both the substance of parti-
cular policy issues and the organizational framework within which policy outputs 
are to be implemented (Jenkins, 1978). That is, it must adopt a holistic view which 
includes the concerns of the natural and social sciences in the same context as the 
governing values and institutions of a society and the hard-nosed considerations and 
trade-offs which policy makers make in the real world. 
This paper is a contribution to the epistemological base for modeling in the policy 
process. It concentrates on the scenario approach (see below), coupled with simu-
lation modeling, using the management of agricultural systems as an example of a 
complex policy application . However, much of what we say should also be pertinent 
for other modeling approaches and applications to other specific areas. 
The Nature of Policy 
It is useful to distinguish between "policy" as a generic term and "a policy" as a 
specific decisional scheme. The generic term "policy" denotes the basic process by 
which decisions are mapped out, weighed, implemented, and adjusted. It implies 
goals to be met or motivations for change, a basic strategy and sequence of tactics 
for dealing with them, and a set of instruments available to the policy maker 
through which he can exercise his mandate. It also includes the processes by which 
different goals, strategies, and tactics are weighed against each other and translated 
into actions as well as the ways in which the system is monitored and adjustments are 
made to compensate for errors in the original assessment. 
The motivations for policy tend to be qualitative and are generally rather loosely 
defined outcomes which the policy maker would like to see as the result of his 
actions. These include things such as better health, greater happiness, more food, 
and a higher standard of living. A typical decision maker also has a more personal 
motivation, such as the desire to maintain or advance his own status within his 
bureau or that of his bureau within the wider political framework. Different indi-
viduals have different motivations for their actions, and the overall constellation of 
motivations within a policy-making institution is generally characterized by an 
uncertain, and perhaps unstable, consensus. The instruments of policy are specific 
"handles" through which the policy maker can influence the system. No complex 
system is completely controllable. Indeed, relatively few factors can be consciously 
adjusted by a decision maker. Those that can be include things like taxing schemes 
and rates, savings rates, allocation mechanisms, quotas, tariffs, technology support 
through research and development, legislation, and the way in which police powers 
are used. 
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Strategy and tactics are mappings between goals and instruments. Strategy is the 
overall view within which problem solutions are perceived. It is more general, and it 
allows for problems which arise along the way. Tactics are the specific short-term 
responses to conditions as they are perceived. They are more limited, and they utilize 
the actor's special abilities to manipulate certain instruments. The process of trans-
lating goals into strategies and strategies into tactics, given an available set of instru-
ments, is one of the main subprocesses of policy. There is no general way to do it, 
and the process is closely related to the policy maker's perception of the set of 
instruments available to him, as well as their relative potency. Not all decision 
makers perceive the usefulness of the various instruments in the same way; nor need 
they even see the same set of instruments as being available to them. So this aspect of 
policy is a very open and individual process. Any attempt to use models to aid in 
policy assessment and design must recognize this fact. 
"A policy" is a much more restricted term referring to a given goal set, a set of 
strategies for these goals, and the associated sets of tactics and instruments for each 
actor involved. A given goal may be reachable (at least in principle) through a wide 
range of alternatives, some of which may be radically different or even antithetical 
in places. In general a given policy will allow limited variation of instrument settings 
within a tactic, of tactics within a strategy, and so forth. 
Policy design is the process of generating and assessing alternatives and choosing 
from among them (Fig. l). Each alternative has different implications, which must 
be understood so that the most appropriate can eventually be chosen for imple-
mentation. Alternative strategies are determined for a given goal set. Tactics must be 
generated, assessed, and chosen for each strategy. Then instruments must be fixed in 
the same way. This process is likely to lead to a relatively large number of feasible 
alternatives within the framework of a given goal set, and the implementation of any 
one may foreclose options on later development of others. 
The resulting multiplicity of options must be assessed and filtered to narrow the 
field so that one can ultimately be chosen for implementation in the real world. 
Ideally, this policy will be capable of meeting its associated goals, or at least of 
moving the system toward them. The alternatives discarded along the way may also 
be useful in helping to improve the efficiency of policy generation and assessment 
procedures, and they may also have some effect on modifying the goals directing the 
policy design process (Mendell and Tanner, 1975). 
The Role of Models 
Mathematical models are a formal way of organizing and presenting policy-
relevant information (Quade, 1975). They have a role both in the generation and in 
the pre-implementation stage of the policy-design process. They can be used in the 
places in Fig. 1 indicated by a double arrow, but the types and purposes of models at 
each position are different. Those which calculate instrument settings are generally 
normative models which calculate ways of reaching social optima or which assess the 
trade-offs that must be faced by decison makers (e.g. Haimes et al., 1975; Heady, 
1978). The structures of such models limit strategic considerations to a very narrow 
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set with limited tactical capabilities. If the structural assumptions of the model 
(generally that the strategy and tactics of goal-seeking can be represented adequately 
by maximizing some identifiable welfare function) correspond to those of the 
decision maker, then they border on irrelevance (Arnaszus, 1974). 
Other models provide estimates of the impact of policy options on the overall 
system. These tend to be large-scale descriptive simulation models which project the 
implications of particular instrument settings (e.g. Mesarovic et al., 1974; Goeller et 
al., 1977). Such models serve to consider a wide range of strategies. The policy-
generation step must precede their use so that instrument settings can be specified, 
and they have no policy generation capabilities of their own. Still other models can 
evaluate the estimated impact of policies. These tend to be relatively simple, abstract 
ways of relating structural changes to goal-seeking (e.g. Dinkel and Erickson, 1978; 
Kantor and Nelson, 1979). 
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But no model can embody the policy-design process, and no model can design 
policy. Too many judgments and interpretations must be made both by the analyst 
and the policy maker. Modelers tend to be different kinds of people than policy 
makers, with different outlooks and styles of operation. This places strong con-
straints on the use (or at least the acceptance) of certain analytical techniques and 
approaches (Martino and Lenz, 1977). No policy maker would ever turn over 
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primary policy-design responsibility to a computer-oriented analyst. The function of 
modeling is to assist the policy maker, and it is a rather subsidiary role at that. 
The criteria for judging the usefulness of a model are properly those of the policy 
maker, not those of the modeler. Modelers commonly judge models on the basis of 
whether they are sophisticated, accurate, precise, realistic, general, or theory-based. 
These considerations are important for the process of modeling, but they are hardly 
related to the values of the decision maker , which are oriented toward the end result. 
If a model of low sophistication and even low precision makes it easier for decision 
makers to filter the options open to them, then it is more useful (or at least it is 
perceived to be so, even if the results of its use are pathologic) than a sophisticated, 
precise model for which the decision maker does not readily see its role in the policy 
process as he perceives it. The "best" model in the world would be useless as a 
policy tool if policy makers could not relate it to specific policies they wanted to 
assess or if it made assumptions which did not fit the realities of the political 
institutions associated with the problem (Majone, 1976). 
This implies two features that are basic to policy models. First, the model 
structure and the way in which it fits into the policy process must be capable of 
reflecting the standards and values of the policy maker, as well as the realities of his 
associated institutional structure (Biswas, 1975). It must consider at least his 
motivations and the instruments of interest to him, and it must recognize the con-
straints on his intensity, freedom, or speed of action (e.g. Wall, 1976). It must be 
capable of considering or designing a constellation of instrument settings which 
corresponds both to his strategic and tactical inclinations. If it cannot, then it cannot 
deal with problems as the policy maker visualizes them. Secondly, the model must be 
usable in the policy process. A model in this context is no more than a tool for 
people with wider interests, and they must be able to use it (Quade, 1971). 
Many modeling techniques involve optimization mechanisms of one sort or 
another. These have proven very useful, both for designing policy where the strategy 
is clear and as a way of endogenizing behavioral responses which can be modeled 
fairly accurately and which are important factors affecting policy acceptance in the 
real world. Such behavioral modeling is often essential to following the proliferation 
of policy-generated impacts through the system (e.g. Spofford et al., 1976). How-
ever, a warning must also be entered: one must be very careful when endogenizing 
behavior in a model. The rules for this behavior must be well understood and 
accepted. But these rules are themselves subject to change as a result of policy and 
other feedbacks within the society. Incorporating phenomena subject to changing 
rules within the structure of a model is extraordinarily difficult. 
A useful policy model, then, must be more than a running computer program. It 
needs to be a part of a system including not only the model but also a capacity for 
generating alternative policies or policy scenarios, as well as the capacity for trans-
lating goals and instruments into model input and interpreting the results in sl)ch a 
way that they are relevant and understandable to policy makers. The sophistication 
of the model is a constraint mainly on the detail of policy analysis that can be done 
using it. Indeed, the sophistication of the overall system really refers to the way the 
model is embedded into a method of use. There is an important distinction between 
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quantification and sophistication. Quantification is only one instrument of mathe-
matical sophistication, albeit a very important one. Mathematics in its larger sense 
deals with relations among concepts, magnitudes, indices, systems, etc. The 
pretention and attempts of many model-builders to quantify the whole socio-
economic process of a society is not only unrealizable; it is not even reasonable 
(Rapoport, 1979). 
Taxonomy and Complexity in Agricultural Production Policy 
Let us confine ourselves hereafter to descriptive policy assessment models, using 
agricultural production policy as an example. This is already an extraordinarily 
complex system. Food production must compete for variable inputs with all other 
sectors of the economy. It deals with biological, pedological, and hydrological 
spheres of the natural environment to which the farmer falls prey. These include the 
population genetics of crop varieties, the community ecology of pests and weeds, 
and the effects of weather perturbations, climatic change, and the "downstream" 
effects of other producers. His efficiency is limited by the technological tools avail-. 
able to him and by the state of the economy into which his production feeds. 
Moreover, a moderately complete description of the crop production system would 
have to consider at least half-a-dozen different actors' viewpoints. And this is only 
for crop production: in order to describe the overall agricultural situation in any 
country, we would also have to consider livestock production, marketing, 
commodity utilization patterns, the competition between the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors of the economy, and so forth. 
A model which attempted to deal directly with any of these sectors might have to 
consider several of them because of their tight interconnectedness. But some of the 
most significant policy questions are related to goals not of any specific area but 
rather to those of several areas as they interact to comprise a larger system. Such an 
analysis must focus on the interrelationships between the constituent issues and 
disciplines as well as on those issues and disciplines per se. And the most important 
expressions of problems are likely to be in the interrelationships between various 
subsystems rather than in the subsystems themselves . How many times, for example, 
have well-meaning decisions been made in which the true nature of the system was 
not understood, and whose results bordered on disaster? For example, the 
governments of several Andean countries have moved people out of their very 
crowded highlands to lowland areas, because living conditions were frankly quite 
bad in the highlands. But after a few years of slash-and-burn agriculture in the 
lowland areas for which the settlers were not really prepared culturally or tech-
nically, the soils were no longer able to support the population, the people were 
worse off than they had been in the highlands, and the country's natural soil 
resource base was permanently damaged (Watters, 1971). 
The analysis of policies affecting complex situations such as this is an extraordin-
arily difficult and complicated undertaking which must necessarily be done by 
people trained not only in various substantive areas but also in understanding and 
dealing with the interrelationships among them. No one person can be trained in all 
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of these things , or even in very many of them. No single body of theory will ever 
cover everything involved. Indeed, any attempt to use a single disciplinary approach 
or single body of theory to do an analysis of complex policy would be committed to 
failure even before it started (Dillon , 1976). 
Actors 
In the same way, no single viewpoint is suitable for assessing or designing policy. 
Any decision maker who is the primary user of a model will have a single viewpoint 
(his own) . It may be complex and not entirely self-consistent, and it may change 
somewhat with his changing perceptions (Quade, 1975; Biswas, 1976). But a model 
which is capable of dealing with complex policy notions is likely to have multiple 
users with multiple viewpoints. And even if this is not the case, any system on which 
a policy is being imposed contains different actors with different goals , roles , 
viewpoints, and impacts on the overall system. These are real people and real institu-
tions, and their interrelationships are themselves complex and dynamic. We seldom 
wish to analyze the policy decisions of all of the actors in any real system. But all do 
affect it, and one cannot wish away their impact simply because an analysis focuses 
on the decisions available to a single key actor. 
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Fig. 2. Examples of policy actors involved in food systems in a typical country, arranged by decreasing 
power from top to bottom, showing some types of interactions among actors . Emphasis is more on 
"downward" or "horizontal" actions . "Upward" actions (e.g. a strike) are only left out in order not to 
confuse the diagram. 
Actors' roles tend to be best understood in qualitative terms, and few model-
builders are equipped to understand their place in a quantitative analysis . One of the 
first interactions between the modeler and his client must therefore be to develop a 
clear-cut identification of the actors in the system and the relations of each to the 
key actors on whose policy decisions the analysis will concentrate (Royston and 
Perkowski, 1975). Figure 2 shows some of the actors that might be involved in a 
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typical agricultural system. They are shown as a hierarchy with certain lines of 
communication between adjacent levels. Decisions made at high levels can be frus-
trated by the actions of those lower in the hierarchy, or they may be amplified by 
concomitant decisions of those lower actors . The same is true in the opposite 
direction (e.g. Jenkins, 1978, Ch. 7) . 
The goals of different actors may be the same, different, or overlapping. Some 
can be expressed easily, others only with extreme difficulty (Donald, 1976). There 
are commonly some agreed-upon national goals to which all actors would submit, 
but these tend to be quite fuzzy. As we identify actors more specifically, their role 
differences begin to stand out, and their goals diverge until those of one actor may 
conflict strongly with those of another. They can be of a very different character, 
and some are dominant over others (Bosse!, 1977). To decide which of these types of 
goals are relevant to a given modeling effort is a difficult task, but it must be carried 
through conscientiously, as goals underlie the motivations for different actors' 
actions in a given situation, and they are a basis for evaluation of the results of those 
actions. This becomes even more complex when results begin to affect the goals. 
Actors are always decision makers, even if they affect only a very small portion of 
the system. Even the small ones identify sets of instruments, tactics, strategies, and 
goals. But their decisions are always oriented toward their role in the system, and 
their impact is conditioned upon their position in the hierarchy. The decision to neg-
lect a given actor generally means either that we want to ignore the instruments at his 
disposal or that we wish to lump them in with somebody else's instruments that are 
already being considered. But instruments gain their importance by their strategic 
location and by the sensitivity of the overall system to their use. Important instru-
ments-and hence important actors-cannot be neglected (Schultze, 1968). 
Focusing on Real Problems in a Model Context 
Models are inherently abstractions and seldom contain elements that are exact 
replicas of the phenomena found in real life. So the use of a model involves a trans-
lation from the goals, strategies, tactics, or instruments which are of greatest 
relevance to the policy maker into terms which are compatible with the model. The 
translation from instrument settings into model input is as critical and difficult a 
phase of using models for complex policy analysis and design as the formulation of 
specific policies from generalized goals . 
The most difficult step in the translation process is often specification of analyti-
cal boundaries. Policy in the real world operates in an infinite context. Models 
cannot. Clear decisions must limit the extent of the system to be considered and 
define the remainder as the environment or the context of that system. There are 
many ways of looking at this question in any given analysis. Perhaps the simplest is 
the multidisciplinary view suggested by a Venn diagram of the various disciplines 
pertinent to an analysis (Fig. 3). This is one way of determining the range of 
substantive areas which must be considered in order to carry out a meaningful 
analysis. If any given discipline or approach does not intersect significantly with 
other disciplines, then it need not be considered . 
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Fig. 3. Venn diagram showing a few important interactions among several disciplines with respect to 
agricultural production questions. Disciplines considered are agricultural production, development 
economics, water resources, ecology, and soil science. The interactions point out at least 12 issues or foci 
which might be considered in a comprehensive view of the problem. The descriptions below are only 
suggestive of these issues. There are many more. Likewise, there are many other possible patterns for 
intersections among the disciplines . 
A. Effect of technological growth on agricultural production; B. Effect of technological growth on 
irrigation technology and response to irrigation; C. Competition for water between agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors; D. Pest control and other ecological aspects of agricultural production; E. Pest 
control and fertilizer responses of irrigated agriculture; F. Soil pollution in irrigated agriculture; produc-
tion response to changes in soil biota; G. Soil erosion, production response to soil pollution; H. Soil 
erosion, fertilizer leaching; I. Salinization; waterlogging of soils; J. Assessment of irrigation potential; K. 
Soil biota and salt content of irrigated soil; L. Yield responses of irrigated crops. 
There are also ways of focusing on a problem by decomposing the system along 
hierarchical rather than along disciplinary lines. A Venn diagram can identify the 
areas which must be considered and some of the questions which must be asked. But 
how deeply into any of these disciplines need analysis go? What bodies of theory 
should be used in each, at what detail, and for what purpose? Most mature disci-
plines comprise sets of issues and subdisciplines that can be arrayed hierarchically. 
An example showing a decomposition of economics for a model of agricultural pro-
duction is given in Fig. 4. The central importance of the agricultural portions of the 
economy is clear, and they are shown within the dashed lines. But it is not clear a 
priori how much detail of the areas outside of the dashed lines must be included in 
order to make meaningful economic judgments for this system as a whole. As part 
of the necessary process of identifying system boundaries, one usually assumes that 
there is some level within the hierarchy above which one no longer needs to consider 
processes explicitly. This allows a boundary to be set at this level and is equivalent to 
saying that information coming down across it into the parts of the system that are 
considered is constant, known, or embodied in parameter estimations. 
But one of the primary features of higher levels of a hierarchy is that they are 
adaptive (Mesarovic et al., 1970). They respond to activities of lower levels. And it is 
risky to draw system boundaries at points separating the model system from higher 
levels which are likely to adapt (and therefore to change) to signals from a lower 
level not included in the analysis. This is especially important for policy models of 
agriculture, because many of the policies with the greatest impact on agriculture are 
not directed towards agriculture per se, but are rather the adaptive responses of 
165 
12 
policy makers to other sectors of the economy. The competition and interactions 
among sectors may have a greater impact on agriculture than direct policy inter-
ventions within agriculture. For example, agricultural policy may favour the use of 
higher levels of fertilizers and pesticides. As a result, the Ministry of Agriculture will 
support the development of an indigenous chemical industry, some of whose 
products would be agricultural chemicals. If the industry is successful, then fertilizer 
and pesticide production are carried along, with beneficial results to agriculture. But 
if it is badly managed or otherwise unsuccessful, the agricultural components may 
suffer, even if their markets are sound. In either case, the prosperity of the overall 
chemical industry has a much larger role in the success of fertilizer and pesticide 
production than agricultural input policies. 
OTHER 
MANUFACTURING 
Fig . 4. Diagrammatic disaggregation of an economy showing agriculture in a broader sense (inside dashed 
line) in relation to the rest of the economy. 
Problems and Processes 
The taxonomies presented so far are basic to any model designed for complex 
policy analysis. But the hierarchies shown in Fig. 4 or the interrelations among 
disciplines shown in Fig. 3 seldom appear explicitly in policy-oriented models. We 
model processes. Whatever resemblance exists between the processes modeled and 
the disciplines considered is generally because model-builders have been trained in 
one or more specific disciplines, and the outlooks or perceptions of those disciplines 
provide them with the easiest entry into their description of a system. 
Conflicts between the perspectives of different approaches often affect the types 
or philosophies of a modeling exercise. One of the most critical is between simul-
taneity as commonly assumed within econometric studies and strict contingency 
relationships as assumed within systems dynamics and related approaches. In most 
real-world agricultural systems, both types can be perceived, and realism requires 
retaining the differences. 
Neither type is simple. For example, the contingency relationships in the system 
can be as illustrated in Fig. 5. For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that each of 
these processes is represented by a model which is drawn from the appropriate body 
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of theory from some discipline. If the output of process "a" is the input of process 
"b", then this means that "b" depends on "a" in order to operate. This is 
commonly a time dependency, but it may be a political or threshold effect as well. 
For example, process "a" might be the decision making process by which the farmer 
allocates his variable inputs to production, and process "b" might be the production 
process by which these variable inputs are converted (with a certain amount of help 
from the sun, rain, soil, and similar phenomena) into saleable commodities. 
Conversely, many processes, such as market clearance, represent decisions made on 
the basis of a great deal of information generated at different points in time but 
considered simultaneously. The difference is critical, and one must build a system in 
such a way that there is never any danger of including factors whose contingency 
order is not correct within a single process or treating specific information flows 
seriatim within which simultaneity of decision making is important. 
Fig. 5. Diagrammatic system showing process a through g and the flows of information among them. 
While the figure is abstract, it may be helpful to associate f and g with market and allocation processes, 
respectively a and e with land use and technological inputs, respectively, c with inputs to livestock, and b 
and d with crop and livestock production, respectively. 
There is another critical dimension to policy-oriented models: policy represents 
control. And the interaction between controlled and controlling systems can often 
be effectively represented in a hierarchical system such as that shown in Fig. 6. In 
such cases, information flows in both directions, but it is asymmetric. The general 
pattern is for control input to lead to a system response which is monitored by the 
controller. The controller then adapts his inputs to reflect his increased under-
standing of the system and its relationship to his own goals (Fig. 7). These 
relationships are never simultaneous, and to consider them so is always misleading, 
if not incorrect. As a general rule, policy inputs into a model are never simultaneous 
with their results, and the responses of subsidiary actors to policy inputs at the 
highest level are always of a contingency sort (Mesarovic et al., 1970). 
!I 
III 
Fig. 6. Diagrammatic system showing processes a through g arrayed in a hierarchical system with three 
levels, I through III. If the processes are the same as in Fig. 5, then level II refers to the functions of the 
farmer as governed to some degree by society (level III); level I refers to the field-level processes which 
result in production. For the nature of the connection, see text and Fig. 7. 
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Fig. 8. The simplified system shown in Figs. 5 and 6 illustrating some of the actions possible for some 
of the actors in the system. The actors included are as follows: G. Government : national and local ; 
I. International agencies, moneylenders, and corporations; M. Manufacturing firms within the country; 
L. Landowners : large and small; F. Farm operators: tenants, owner-operators. 
The actions noted are as follows: I. Taxing and incentives; 2. Competition: both market-oriented and 
political; 3. Investment patterns; 4. Technological R & D support; 5. Market responses and assessment of 
future development; 6. Land-use patterns; 7. Care provided, expertise, services available; 8. Market 
manipulation, controls; 9. Support for farm-market transportation . 
If policy represents control, it is also true that no system such as agriculture is 
fully controllable. Some processes cannot be influenced by available policy 
instruments, while others can be affected in several ways by different actors. A 
diagram such as Fig. 8, which connects controllers and actions associated with the 
processes, can be very revealing. Such a diagram is implicit in any model of policy 
analysis, although it is seldom explicit. 
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We previously touched on the question of how one determines which actors must 
be considered in a complex policy analysis and which ones may safely be neglected. 
We can now answer it much more effectively. Any model is ultimately a framework 
for interacting processes. As such, the significance of any given actor can be 
measured by whether or not his adaptive responses are sufficient to affect the 
behavior of some process which the key actors are trying to control. If so, then these 
adaptive responses-and hence, the actor making them-must be considered. If his 
responses do not alter the suitability of the key actors' chosen control tactics, then 
he can be neglected, at least with respect to this process. Of course it may be possible 
to neglect a given actor by this criterion for one feasible policy with regard to a given 
goal set, but he may still have a significant role in an alternative policy. The 
importance of an actor in a policy analysis situation depends on the policy in 
question, less on the goals to which it is directed. 
Scenario Analysis 
The picture given here is one of immense complexity, with several taxonomies 
needed simply to describe the complexity, let alone to deal with it. In order to build 
policy-oriented models at all, one must recognize a gradient of simplification. At the 
extremes, one must either reduce complexity to fewer aspects of the problem, retain 
the numbers of aspects but reduce the complexity of interactions, or retain the 
complexity of the system within the analysis but external to the model. The first is 
mathematically more elegant, but the latter two are probably more generally useful 
and can be carried out using the technique of scenario analysis. 
If a simulation model is an excellent device for examining the impact of policies 
on a larger system, it is well adapted to the pre-implementation assessment phase of 
policy design . Multiple runs simulating different policy alternatives show the 
sensitivity of different combinations of instruments as well as the effectiveness of a 
priori chosen policy options. Each run represents a set of assumptions (i.e. a pclicy 
set), or scenario (Knauer, 1978; Carr, 1976; Vanston et al., 1977). 
Exogenous vs Endogenous Considerations within Scenarios 
Scenario analysis of policy problems is becoming increasingly widely used, and 
some variant is probably essential to the pre-implementation assessment loop shown 
in Fig. I (Kahalas, 1977; Committee on Water Resources Planning, 1976; Goeller et 
al., 1977). It recognizes that policy represents an attempt by decision makers to 
respond to explicit problems and that the evolution of policies at any point in time 
need not be a continuation of past policies. At the extremes, policies may change 
rather radically with changes in government or ministers, or policy evolution may be 
a series of small increments that respond to problems of the moment and show a 
minimum of concern either for the future or for continuity with the stimuli- which 
have governed policy steps in the past. In any case, goals of societies change, as do 
the instruments at their disposal for reaching them. It is obvious that policy at this 
level cannot be endogenized into a model, but must rather be supplied exogenously 
by a decision maker or a user simulating a decision maker (Mesarovic et al. , 197 4) 
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The user and the model are linked during the scenario analysis process, so that the 
user is in essence a "model of himself" .1 
This should not be taken to mean that the effects of policies which are consistent 
with the past cannot be endogenized and that approaches which attempt to do so, 
such as econometrics, are not successful. Such models have too good a track record 
to allow this to be said. But econometric estimation can embody only the results of 
policy, not policy itself. And policies which may change radically in the future are 
not reflected in past time-series or cross-sectional data. More important, perhaps, 
when a policy is assumed to be embodied in an estimation procedure, it is not 
accessible for evaluation. The trajectory of actions and instrument settings implicit 
in the data and which have been assumed by the estimation procedures are fixed in 
the model. They can form only a marginal part of any set of tactical alternatives 
involved in policy design. 
Scenario analysis is not a single or a simple technique. There is a gradient of how 
much should be considered exogenously. At one extreme, policy is entirely exo-
genous (Mesarovic et al., 1974; Clapham, 1977). Scenario policy specification must 
be very complete, all-inclusive, and highly realistic. It is not acceptable for 
important factors to be neglected. An exogenous scenario must represent a thought-
ful assessment of the patterns of available instruments. This is one of its great 
strengths as well as its greatest difficulty: the user must know what he is talking 
about. Where the policy instruments are relatively straightforward, and where their 
use is a thoughtful response to conditions and represents a commitment of the 
government (or other actor) to a changed way of dealing with a problem, this can be 
a highly useful approach. 
The exogenous scenario is also useful where the rules of actors' behavior cannot 
be delineated. In this sense, the scenario no longer represents a thoughtful policy 
commitment from the actor in question. Rather it represents a guess about the com-
posite behavior of a number of different actors. In most cases, the exogenous 
scenario as it is used in practical policy modeling represents a cross between these 
two modes. The disadvantages of exogenous scenarios are also significant and must 
be specified. They do not respond directly to changes in the structure of the system. 
Only by close interaction between user and model can the learning process proceed. 
This is costly both in user time and in computer time. 
At the other end of the gradient, much policy may be considered endogenously by 
the model. Behavioral equations may represent societal behavior which cannot be 
controlled, policy decisions, or anything in between (Kopelman and Weaver, 1978). 
The advantage of this approach is that simulation of behavior is dynamic and res-
ponsive to changing conditions, just as in the real world. Such policies and their 
associated instruments are not evaluated by the model. But if the rules of generation 
for such policies are sufficiently well understood for endogenization to be possible, 
then this would not be necessary. There are many examples where policy rules are 
understood and where endogenization is appropriate, such as pricing behavior for 
1 This is a characterization by Professor Peter D. Junger of the School of Law, Case Western Reserve 
University, Cleveland, Ohio. The same argument is implicit in the caveats about "hard" and "soft" 
variables and the role of judgments in Mendell and Tanner (1975). 
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agricultural commodities within the European Economic Community. The same 
may be true of the behavior of key actors in a system. But rules which apply to one 
society may not apply to another. For example, it is appropriate to assume that 
farmers in North America or Western Europe act in such a way as to try to maximize 
their profit. But the farmer in most poor developing countries does not act to 
maximize profit, but rather acts to satisfice between profit and survival. Any 
agronomist with field experience in developing countries can tell stories about 
farmers planting many lines of crops, often in the same field, so that individual 
yields of all were depressed. The results did not lead to profit maximization in any 
sense. Rather they led to meager profit in a good year and enough food for the 
farmer and his family to eat in a poor year. 
It is likely that some factors will be endogenized and some will be exogenized in 
any useful scenario-based policy model. Many trade-offs must be carefully con-
sidered during the model design process . These include detail of systems response, 
transparency of model structure to the user, and breadth of analysis. 
The Technique of Scenario Specification 
The scenario specification process can be summarized as in Fig. 9. The basis of the 
analysis is the motive scenario, a set of motivations which determines the purposes, 
directions, and boundaries for the analysis. These goals can be regarded as the 
problem set. Once the motive scenario is chosen, a set of preferred strategies and 
tactics is determined for the actors who are considered in the analysis, and the 
instruments and instrument settings are chosen. 
A specific scenario comprises a set of instrument settings which is thought 
appropriate to realize the motive scenario. In principle, an infinite number of 
specific scenarios might correspond to any motive scenario, and in practice the 
number may be very large (Biswas, 1975). The analyst must generate a large number 
of possible scenarios and filter out all but the most useful. The mechanism may be 
entirely intuitive, or it may involve the use of special techniques. The result of this is 
a relatively small number of scenarios which will actually be assessed using the 
simulation model. 
Implementation requires first that the scenario be translated into model input so 
that it can be handled by the computer. This is possible only to the degree that the 
parameters of the model are appropriate "handles" for policy actions. The various 
elements of the policy set must be identified with model variables and then 
translated into numerical inputs. When the input set is complete, the model can be 
run, and the output reflects the calculated responses of the system to the policy 
actions simulated by the inputs. Any scenario then consists of an input set reflecting 
actions of the policy maker and an output set reflecting the behavior of the system. 
This relationship is summarized in some detail in Fig. 10. 
After the model has been run, the results must be interpreted, both for the 
performance of the policy scenario and for the adequacy of the model. The first 
refers to the degree to which the policy scenario is capable of realizing the motive 
scenario; the second refers to the model validity and the degree to which the model 
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and its associated software are capable of assessing scenarios of interest to users. 
Interpretation in both of these dimensions considers both the policies being tested 
and the capacity of the model to assist in their design. Scenario analysis may show 
that the goals cannot be met or that they are not sufficiently ambitious, so that the 
motive scenario should be changed. It may suggest changes in the method of 
generating or building specific scenarios, and it may lead to new strategies or tactics . 
It may lead to different methods of translating policy scenarios into model input, 
and it may even lead to changes in the structure of the model itself. 
Perhaps the most difficult part of a scenario-based policy analysis is the construc-
tion of the reference scenario. This is a summary of all of the default policy sets of 
the "highest-probability" or "status-quo" sort. Here is done most of the research 
on "knowing what you're talking about", as the analyst develops a basic feeling for 
the policy situation in the society. Calibration and historical validation of the model 
are generally carried out as part of the reference scenario process, and the structure 
of the model is brought to a level where it can recapitulate the past. But policy 
analysis and design are seldom done successfully with regard only to the past: they 
are inherently future-oriented. Therefore historical validation is not sufficient. The 
reference scenario is also a set of default parameters for future projection. It thus 
requires sufficient understanding of the qualitative causes of the patterns of the past 
for them to be extrapolated into the future, given the perspective and realities of the 
present. Only then have we devised an adequate reference scenario. 
The function of the reference scenario is to serve as a basis against which other 
scenarios can be judged, knowing that directed and informed change is likely to be 
more socially acceptable-and therefore more likely-than stasis . There are many 
ways of generating scenarios . The types of motive scenarios considered as well as the 
breadth and intensity of actions depend on the purpose of the analysis . Different 
actors have different roles, and the number and positions of actors considered have 
a major effect on the analysis. To a degree at least , the strategy-tactic-instrument set 
is actor-specific, and the analysis may be fairly straightforward once the actors to be 
considered have been specified . But in some cases, actors can change their alliances, 
their coalitions, and their relative roles . These may be subtle changes, but they may 
have profound effects. 
Conflicting Goals of Modeling Efforts: Multiple Clients 
Simulation models of complex policy are generally very large interdisciplinary 
multi-actor models. Such models can generally have many potential clients, 
especially those models which treat international problems or problems with 
international implications . But it is not always possible for potential clients to agree 
on model structure or analytical approach. It is not even always possible for people 
working on the same model or within the same group to agree on these factors. If the 
usefulness of a model is any criterion of its worth, it would seem that a model which 
could serve more than one client effectively would be more worthwhile than a model 
which could serve only one client. 
The disagreements between people in the modeling process can occur at any phase 
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of model development. If the disagreement is over scenario specification, then it can 
be resolved by allowing different clients to establish different scenarios. This is to be 
expected and is often useful to modelers, as different clients often represent 
different actors within the system, and their differences can point out important 
factors of system structure. The different actors operate from different motive 
scenarios, and they have different instruments available to them. It is only 
reasonable that their different interests result in different specific scenarios. 
But the differences may also be in the interpretation of the processes which should 
be considered and in their relative importance. These too can be resolved, at least to 
a degree, through building flexibility into the model so that different modules can be 
substituted for. different clients . Indeed it may be possible to alter structure 
efficiently through alteration of parameters. Interpretation of processes may be a 
very important problem, but it is likely to be most serious if the proper foundation 
for the modeling effort was not laid, if the various actors and instrument sets were 
not identified, and if no attention was paid to accommodating potential users at 
future points in time. An effort to develop a model by a strategy that allows for 
maximum flexibility should make it possible to work out process disagreements by 
substituting modules on a process-by-process basis. 
The most serious disagreement which can come up in a modeling effort is with 
respect to model focus. It is very difficult to resolve problems which come about 
because people disagree on the way system boundaries should be set. This 
disagreement does not involve processes or modules within a construct which can be 
"unplugged" and "plugged in" but rather the fundamental rationale behind the 
construction of the model. But even this can be ameliorated if a commitment is 
made to disagree but to accommodate at the same time. In this case, we need to 
identify both the "lowest common denominator" and also the "highest common 
denominator''. The former refers to those parts of the model which can, in fact, be 
common to the various clients. Ideally, this will be all or at least most of the simplest 
version of the model. The "highest common denominator" is a hypothetical model 
with specifications which would enable it to meet all requirements of all clients even 
though it might be impossible to implement and almost certainly would not be very 
useful. One must then identify the options that must be left open for each client. As 
the "lowest common denominator" model is being built, care should be taken to 
close as few options as possible. If this is done, the modeling effort can generate a 
family of models with a common core and the capability for disparate application. 
A Plan for Model Development 
Computer simulation models can process vast quantities of information, data, and 
judgments to bring them to a form useful for policy assessment and design. That is 
their power, but unless they are constructed and presented so that they can be used, 
they have no role whatsoever. Model-building is a highly dynamic process where the 
state of a model at any point in time is determined by clients, model-builders, and 
technical factors such as the information available to both and the available 
computer capacity. 
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The key to the usefulness of policy-oriented simulation models is the relationship 
between the model-builder and the policy maker. Some care must be given to 
building this relationship early in the exercise. The model-builder must understand 
what the policy maker needs, and the latter must have a feeling for what the former 
can provide him with, and how it will fit into his decision-making structure. Neither 
of these points can be generalized. The policy maker may need help in assessing the 
differences between available options, getting a feel for the wider implications of 
options he has already chosen, or designing new and unique options. But what he 
needs depends on the nature and dynamics of the particular problems at hand as well 
as on his own personality and position. In the same way, model-builders can deliver 
advice, predictions, projections, or interpretations at varying levels of sophistication 
and detail. These are also in accordance with their personalities and backgrounds. 
Policy modeling is an iterative process. The model-builder must proceed on the 
basis of tentative understandings of the system as the policy maker sees it, and his 
view of the system and the nature of the model he builds are updated through 
interactions with his client. These understandings must be tentative, both because 
complex policy systems in the real world are constantly changing, and also because it 
is unrealistic to expect that a model-builder's perception of the system is good 
enough to build the right model the first time. 
Perhaps the first basis that needs to be agreed on concerns the taxonomies of the 
overall analysis. What actors must be considered? For agricultural policy, this 
clearly includes farmers and numerous government agencies. It probably includes 
marketers for agricultural chemicals and machinery, if they affect farmers' decisions 
on uses of fertilizers and pesticides. But the system may respond very strongly to 
people who have no direct role in agriculture and who would almost certainly be 
overlooked by a modeler. Examples are pressure groups and agencies regulating 
agricultural inputs or commodities. Next, what is the problem as perceived by the 
policy maker? How does this perception correspond to that of the other actors, and 
what do the differences in perception say about the nature of the system? Are there 
instruments which might be available for solving the problem but which are not 
being used, or which could be used better? What constrains people's actions? We are 
commonly aware of the legislative constraints, but the indirect constraints which 
stem from culture, tradition, or the structural interactions among actors or 
institutions may be equally important. 
It goes without saying that no model is ever complete; nor can any model be 
expected to show complete correspondence with the real world. Simply because the 
model-builder is aware of the important actors, their perceptions of the system, the 
instruments available, and the constraints on their use, does not mean that he should 
or even could include them in his model. Indeed one of the greatest advantages of 
the scenario approach is that it enables model-builders to build simple models for 
which data are sufficient for parameter estimation, and for which the critical 
questions can still be addressed within the context of the overall analysis. If the 
model is built in a modular fashion, then it is relatively easy to make technical 
changes or even to have multiple groups working on a single model. In this fashion, 
the shared expertise of various groups of modelers and policy makers can be brought 
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to bear for the benefit of all of the constituent groups, while the different missions, 
approaches, and biases of the groups remain separate and mutually supportive, 
while allowing checks on each other. 
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